Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

State of Utah v. Tevita F. Tafuna : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald Fujino; Law Office of Ronald Fujino; Counsel for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; R.
Joshua Player; Matthew Janzen; Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Tafuna, No. 20090105 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1498

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20090105-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
TEVITAF.TAFUNA,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Stephen Roth presiding
KENNETH A BRONSTON (4470)

Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RONALD FUJINO

R. JOSHUA PLAYER
MATTHEW JANZEN

Law Office of Ronald Fujino
4764 South 900 East, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Not Requested
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 1 6 2011

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CaseNo.20090105-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
TEVITA F. TAFUNA,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
Appeal from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Stephen Roth presiding
A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
KENNETH

RONALD FUJINO

R. JOSHUA PLAYER
MATTHEW JANZEN

Law Office of Ronald Fujino
4764 South 900 East, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, UT 84117

Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Not Requested

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

STATUTE

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

,

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4
7

ARGUMENT

10

I. DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR WHEN HE AGREED THAT A
JUROR WHO CONVERSED WITH A WITNESS SHOULD REMAIN
ON THE JURY; IN ANY CASE, THE JUROR'S CONVERSATION WAS
NOT WITH A CRITICAL WITNESS AND WAS, AT MOST,
INCIDENTAL/UNINTENDED AND BRIEF
10
A. The proceedings concerning the contact between a juror and a
witness

11

B. Defendant invited any error when he affirmatively chose not to
move to dismiss a juror who conversed with a witness

13

C. The juror-witness contact was incidental, unintended, and brief

18

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE WITNESS
BRIEFLY MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED INFORMATION... 25
A. The proceedings concerning the detective's reference to IDs found
in Defendant's jacket
25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

B. Any prejudice stemming from the unintentional reference to the
IDs was cured when parties quickly moved on without further
reference, and the trial court struck the evidence and gave a
curative instruction
CONCLUSION

.

27
32

ADDENDA
Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004)
Addendum B: Transcript, Jury Trial, October 22,2008 pp. 1-6
Transcript, Turv Trial, October 24,2008 "nn. 54-6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES

Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah App. 1990)

2,5, 6,18

State v. Allen 2005 UT 11,108 P.3d 730, cert. denied,5±6 U.S. 832
State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291,55 P.3d 1158

....28
,

State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415,237 P.2d 941 (1925)

31
20,22

State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688(Utah App. 1995),
cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996)

1

State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133

passim

State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221(Utah 1976)

29

State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998)

...24

State v. Owvez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191,186 P.3d 1023..

15,24

State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345 (Ut App. 1991)

......15,18

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57,993 P.2d 837

15,18

State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254,

...31

P.3d

State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620 (Utah App. 1992)..

,

,22

State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, 86 P.3d 742

13

State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988)

29

State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 70 P.3d 111

13, 25,26

State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998)

..„

State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, 975 P.2d 469

31
1,3,7,12

State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (UT App. 1987)
revxd on other grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)..

23

State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5,128 P.3d 1179

13

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)

31

State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355,246 P.3d 151

24

State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1,464 P.2d 844, (Utah 1970)

..'

State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985)

17,19
passim

State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219(Utah 1997)
State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929 (UT App 1989)
State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009 (Utah App. 1992)
State v.Wach, 2001 UT 35, 24 P.3d 948

27
13,14,15,18
21, 22
........15,18

State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185,4 P.3d 100
State v. Winfield, 2005 UT 4,128 P.3d 1171

27
13,24

STATE STATUTES AND RULES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004)

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (West 2009)

..1

Utah R. App. P. 23B

...3,25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

Case No. 20090105-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATEOFUTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

TEVITA F. TAFUNA,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether this Court should review Defendant's claim that the trial court
erred in failing to excuse a juror who communicated with a prosecution witness
where Defendant invited any error?
Standard of Review. "[Reviewing court] decline[s] to address [a claim of error]
because the '[defendant] invited the very error complained of on appeal.'" State v.
Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, f 23,975 P.2d 469 (quoting State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,
700 (Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). Assuming review on the
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merits, the trial court's decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Logan City v.
Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224,225 (Utah App. 1990) (reviewing denial of new trial motion,
based on alleged improper seating of juror who had improper contact with bailiff,
for abuse of discretion) (citation omitted).
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a motion for
mistrial after a state witness briefly mentioned previously excluded information?
Standard of Review. A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's denial of
a motion for mistrial absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Butterfield, 2001UT 59, ^f
46,27P.3dll33.
STATUTE
The following statute is attached at Addendum A.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery (Count I), a first degree
felony, and purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a
restricted person (Count II), a class A misdemeanor. R6-7. The case was tried to a
jury over three days. R185-94. Before the State presented its first witness, a juror
disclosed to the trial court that he had mistakenly spoken with a witness. R289:3-4.
After speaking with the juror and with the agreement of the prosecutor and defense
counsel, the court allowed the juror to remain on the panel. Id. at 5-6.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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At the end of the second day of trial, Defendant moved to dismiss Count II.
R189. The State agreed, and the trial court granted the motion. Id.; R294:326.
Just before the jury left the courtroom to deliberate, Defendant suggested that,
in an excess of caution, the juror might be replaced with an alternate. R290:51,55.
The trial court refused, based on the parties' approval of the juror, the untimeliness
of the motion, and the apparent lack of juror taint. Id. at 55-56. The jury convicted
Defendant of aggravated robbery. R203. The trial court sentenced Defendant to
The a statutory five-years-to-life term in the Utah State Prison. R261-62. Defendant
timely appealed. R266. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court.
R283.
Upon Defendant's motion and without opposition from the State, this Court
temporarily remanded the case back to the trial court to clarify whether the
deliberating jurors included the juror who had communicated with a prosecution
witness. R311. Following remand, the trial court identified the juror and confirmed
that the juror had deliberated and served as jury foreperson.

R314-19.

Thereafter, Defendant moved for a remand under Utah R. App. P. 23B to
determine whether his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to develop facts that
would show he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to juror at issue.
This Court denied the motion, ruling that the record was adequate to determine the
matter on appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Offense
Defendant went to a Halloween party on October 27,2007, where he and his
friend, PJ Valdez, stole numerous items from the party's hosts, and Defendant
threatened other partiers with a knife when they tried to prevent his escape. R293:45,13,18,19,63-64.
Jesse Surfass was at the party, hosted at the Sandy home of Mark McMillen
and Jesse's friends, Grant and Joel Wolmuth, brothers. Id. at 4-5,32,44. Having just
moved into this home, Grant was showing his friend, Mark Buyer, around the house
and led Mark to his main floor bedroom. Id. at 9,48. The door to the bedroom was
closed and Defendant stood in front of it with his arms folded across his chest. Id. at
10, 31. Grant said to Defendant, "Well, let me get into my room." Id. at 9.
Defendant answered, "No, you can't go in there." Id. R293:14. Grant reached
around Defendant and opened the door; at the same time, Defendant backed into
the bedroom, pulled a knife from his pocket, flipped it open and, holding it at Grant
from about four feet away, threatened him to "[bjack the fuck off." Id. at 14-15,5960. Both Jesse and Grant saw Valdez counting out change from Grant's change jar.
Id. at 13,58-59. Grant, now standing in the doorway, threw up his hands and asked
Defendant to drop his "stuff" and leave. Id. at 14-16. Instead, Defendant, still
brandishing the knife, grabbed a small black laptop computer bag from the
bedroom. Id. at 16-18,36-37. Defendant continued to "aggressively]" brandish the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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knife to hold off the other guests who had gathered as he and Valdez left the room
and made their way down the stairs to exit the house. Id. at 16-25.
Five other guests — Mark Buyer, Angela Gallo, Jessica Parry, Cody Fehr, and
Shawn Biel—in addition to others, collectively testified to the same events: Grant
looked "kind of startled" in finding two men in his bedroom, and asked them what
they were doing there and whether they were stealing anything (R294:ll-12,63,77);
Defendant pulled out a knife and threatened, "[y]ou don't want none of this,"as
Grant stepped into his bedroom (id. at 13; R294:29-30); one of the intruders "had a
pocket full of change" (R293:12); Defendant pressed the knife blade to the face of a
party guest who tried to stop him as he made his way out of the house (R293:79;
294:66,79); and the bedroom was in disarray after Defendant and Valdez ransacked
it. R294:189. Defendant carried a CD or DVD player as he made his way out of the
house. Id. at 266-67.
Defendant and Valdez ran down the stairs, brandishing knives at the party
guests as they made their way out of the house. R294:103-05. Grant went back to
his "ransacked" bedroom, and, grabbing some knives to defend his guests, gave one
of them to Cody and pursued Defendant and Valdez out to the front yard. R293:6263, 85-87, 90; 294:32. There, Grant overtook Valdez and held a knife to his throat
and demanded that Valdez "drop [his] stuff." R293:87,94. Defendant broke off his
retreat, turned, and came at Grant, brandishing his knife. R293:95; 294:34. Other
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guests tackled Defendant and kicked and punched him, but he and Valdez broke
away and fled in their car. R293:96; R294:33, 37, 68-69, 82-83,111-12,130,146-47,
214-16,220-22. Valdez carried a black bag into the the car. R294:247-49. In the fight
and in their flight, Valdez wounded Joel Wolmuth, TC Valdez, Shawn Biels, and
Marty Newbury with a knife, and Defendant was stabbed in one of his eyes.
R294:37,48-49, 70, 86, 93, 111, 129,149.
During the fight, one of the guests called the police, who arrived about five
minutes later. R294:269-70.
Grant reported that numerous items were taken from his room: a laptop,
three iPods, an iPod radio player, a watch, a cell phone, University of Utah season
tickets, a camera, a pager, a few remote controls, paperwork, and a DVD player.
R293:63-64. He recovered most of these items after Cody retrieved the black laptop
computer bag later that evening. R293:64-67; 294:35-36. Additional stolen property
was delivered to the police. R293:89; R294151-53.
During his direct examination, the investigating detective testified that he
received a "leather coat with several people - - several people type IDs in one of its
pockets/' testimony the parties had stipulated would not be mentioned. R294:174,
285-86, 292. Defendant moved for a mistrial. Id. at 295-97. The court denied the
motion because the reference was brief and neither party dwelt on it. M a t 297.
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The Defense
Defendant testified that he did not act as a lookout or help Valdez steal
anything from Grant's bedroom and that he was in the kitchen when the "ruckus"
began. R295:18-20,27-28. Rather, seeing Valdez in an argument, he pushed his way
through the crowd, stood in front of the door, and asked permission to get Valdez
and leave. Id. at 23. But one guest would not allow him to leave and brandished a
knife at him. Id. at 24. Fearing for his life, Defendant grabbed a knife from
somewhere in Grant's bedroom. Id. at 25. Then, without threatening anyone, and
using the knife only defensively, he ran down the stairs to get out of the house. Id.
at26,53-54.
Defendant ran from the house toward the car in which he had come to the
party. Id. at 27-30. As he opened the door to the car, someone grabbed him from
behind and he was hit in the eye. Id. at 30-32. After repeated efforts to break from
the crowd surrounding him, Defendant was tackled, stabbed in the shoulder, then
punched and kicked. Id. at 32-36. Finally, someone helped him to the car. Id. at 36.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to excuse a witness who
communicated with one of the State's witnesses. In his discussion, however,
Defendant fails to mention that he invited any error when he emphatically endorsed
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the witness, observing that he believed "nothing inappropriate happened/' the juror
took his "honest mistake" very seriously, and that the juror would act
conscientiously as a juror. The trial court relied on Defendant's observations and
allowed the juror to remain on the jury. Although Defendant later suggested that
the court replace the questioned juror just as the jury retired to deliberate, he failed
to preserve his claim because he offered no further evidence that the juror was
tainted. Because Defendant invited any error in the juror's being seated and later
failed to effectively preserve his claim, the Court should decline to review it.
But even considering the claim, Defendant has failed to show that the jurorwitness contact was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice. The contact was
incidental, unintended, and brief. The juror explained that he accidentally turned
down the wrong hallway in the courthouse and so encountered witnesses rather
than jurors. A witness made a comment about how long he had been waiting,
which initiated a two-minute conversation about airport carpeting. When both
parties realized their mistake in talking to each other, they immediately ended their
conversation. Defendant's cited authority does not support this juror-witness
contact was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice.

And even if the

conversation did favorably incline the juror toward the witness, the juror could not
reasonably have reached a different decision where the State called numerous
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witnesses who consistently and redundantly testified as to each and every element
required to prove Defendant's guilt.
'.'•

II.

Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion
based on a detective's reference, in contravention of the parties' stipulation, that IDs
belonging to other people were found in the pocket of a jacket likely belonging to
Defendant. The trial court, however, did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion. The court correctly recognized that the reference was very brief, the
prosecutor immediately moved on, and defense counsel saved his objection until
out of the hearing of the jury. Further, the reference was somewhat vague in that it
did not necessarily mean that Defendant was involved in criminal activity.
Additionally, the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative instruction,
directing the jury to disregard the detective's brief reference. Finally, any prejudice
stemming from the reference was nullified by strong evidence of guilt from multiple
witneses.
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ARGUMENT
I-

• .

DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR WHEN HE AGREED THAT
A JUROR WHO CONVERSED WITH A WITNESS SHOULD
REMAIN ON THE JURY; IN ANY CASE, THE JUROR'S
CONVERSATION WAS NOT WITH A CRITICAL WITNESS AND
WAS, AT MOST, INCIDENTAL, UNINTENDED AND BRIEF
Defendant claims that "the trial court erred in failing to excuse a juror who
communicated with the State's witness/' Aplt. Br. at 9. The claim fails because
Defendant invited any error when, after the trial court interviewed the juror, he
encouraged the court to allow the juror to remain on the jury. Further, Defendant's
belated suggestion, when the jury was about to begin deliberations, that it might be
wise to substitute the possibly tainted juror with an alternate juror, failed to
preserve his claim of error because the suggestion was unaccompanied by any
reason for the juror's substitution. In any event, the court did not err in allowing the
juror to remain on the jury because the evidence shows that the juror had only an
incidental, unintended, and brief conversation that was unlikely to have influenced
the juror and which was with a witness who could not have been key to the State's
case.
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A. The proceedings concerning the contact between a juror and a
witness.
After the jury had been selected, but before trial began, the trial court learned
that a juror had spoken with a prosecution witness. R289:3.1 Outside the presence
of the other jurors and in the company of counsel for the parties, the court listened
to the juror describe the contact. R289:3-4. The juror explained that he had
inadvertently walked over to a group in the courthouse he thought were fellow
jurors and engaged in a brief conversation about airport carpeting with a person he
later realized was a witness. Id. The conversation lasted about two minutes, which
the juror terminated as soon he realized his mistake. Id. The juror apolgized for his
mistake and assured the court that it would not happen again. Id. at 4.
After the juror left the courtroom, the judge said that the contact sounded like
"a pretty innoxious encounter/' R289:4. Defense counsel agreed. Id. The prosecutor
suggested that the juror might be made an alternate and observed that the juror
appeared to feel bad about the error. Id. Defense counsel interjected:
Yeah, I think that I don't feel differently.
Well, nothing
inappropriate happened, that's my feeling. But you could tell he
takes it very seriously. It is an honest mistake. He feels so badly
about it. He said it wouldn't happen again. I think he's going to be
a conscious [sic] and good juror.
Id. at 5.

1

The transcript of all the proceedings relating to the juror-witness contact is
attached at Addendum B.
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The court responded, "I suspect that's true/' reasserted its view that the
encounter appeared innocuous, and stated that he believed that the juror-witness
contact "did seem to be of such a nature he's not likely to be influenced in any way
pro or con." Id. Without objection from either party, the court allowed the juror to
remain on jury, admonishing him not to discuss the contact with the other jurors.
Id. at 5-6.
Just before the case was given to the jury, defense counsel moved, "just in
abundance of caution," that the juror at issue be replaced with an alternate on the
possibility that the juror might be tainted. R290: 55. The court denied this motion
and reminded defense counsel that the court had questioned this juror early on in
the process and that "[njobody expressed any objection to that at that point," even
as the parties had removed other jurors for cause. Id. The court then "reasserted its]
conclusion that [the juror] was not tainted by the process." Id. The judge further
stated that he "believe[d] that there was an inadvertent and fleeting discussion with
those witnesses. Again, they [sic] didn't know who they were. And there was no
taint to it. And that the issue had been resolved before this [motion] had been
requested." Id. at 55-56.
After the jury announced its verdict and the jurors were polled, Defendant
informed the trial court that both alternate jurors had stated they would not have
found Defendant guilty. Id. at 61-62. The prosecutor confirmed that the jurors had
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so stated. Id. at 62. The alternates, however, did not participate in the jury's
deliberations. R290:52-54.
**-. Defendant invited any error when he affirmatively chose not to
move to dismiss a juror who conversed with a witness.
"[W]here a party affirmatively expresses to the trial court his assent to the
composition of the jury, that party cannot challenge the composition of the jury on
appeal." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, If 18,128 P.3d 1179 (holding affirmative assent to
composition of jury following voir dire invited error as to claim of biased jury on
appeal) (citing State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, | 54, 70 P.3d 111 (noting that a party
invites error if she "affirmatively represents] to the court that. . . she [has] no
objection")). See also State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (UT App 1989) ("It is well
settled that '[i]f the complaining party participated therein, or having knowledge
thereof, failed to make timely objection, relief by new trial will not be granted, for
reason that a party will not be allowed either to obtain advantage from his own
wrong or to remain silent and speculate upon the chances of a verdict/") (citation
omitted). "Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that "'a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error/"" State v. Winfield, 2005 UT 4,f15,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, f 9, 86 P.3d 742)(additional citations omitted).
Thus, where a defendant has had an opportunity to move to dismiss a juror and
affirmatively refuses to make the motion and, further, approves the trial court's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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decision to allow the juror to remain on the jury, the defendant is barred from later
raising the issue on appeal.
Smith addressed a similar instance of invited error. After receiving a report
from a juror that she had received a threatening telephone call, the court questioned
the juror. Smith, 776 P.2d at 931. The juror assured the court that she was
unaffected by the threat and felt she could continue to serve and deliberate fairly.
Id. Responding to the court's inquiry, Defendant stated that he had no problem
with the juror, that he would not move for a mistrial, and that the trial should
proceed. Id. At the close of trial, and concerned that other jurors may have received
improper contacts, the court questioned each juror individually All jurors denied
any contact, and the juror in question stated she had received no other improper
contact. Id. Again, following the questioning," defendant stated that he would like
to proceed with the existing jury and that he expressly did not want a mistrial/' Id.
After Smith was convicted, he moved for a new trial based on the improper
juror contact. Id. This Court agreed with the lower court's denial of the motion,
explaining that "[a] defendant cannot lead the court into error by failing to object
and then later, when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions." Id. at
932. The Court held that Smith had two opportunities to object and "[hje
deliberately and affirmatively refused on both occasions, and therefore defendant
waived his right to now to complain that he was deprived of the right to trial by an
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impartial jury." Id. See also State v. Day, 815 P.2d 1345 (Ut App. 1991) (holding claim
of improper juror-witness contact waived where defendant invited error in
"affirmatively cho[osing] not to raise objection" during trial and instead waiting
until"after final adjudiction of the matter").
The Court should similarly find that defendant invited any error concerning
the juror's inadvertent contact with a witness in this case. Here, defense counsel
had ample opportunity to move to dismiss the juror after the juror admitted the
inadvertent contact. Not only did defense counsel not take the opportunity to
object, but he also "deliberately and affirmatively refused" to do so, explaining that
he believed the contact was not problematic. R289:5; Smith, 776 P.2d at 932. Thus,
because Defendant invited any error in allowing the juror to remain on the jury, the
Court should decline to consider Defendant's claim of improper juror-witness
contact.
The Court should also decline to consider Defendant's claim because he has
not marshaled the crucial procedural evidence supporting the trial court's decision
to permit the juror to continue to sit. "[I]n order to challenge a trial court's factual
findings, a party must marshal all the evidence in favor of the very findings they
oppose on appeal." State v. Clwvez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 7,186 P.3d 1023
(citation omitted). "Where the challenging party fails to adequately marshal the
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evidence, [the appellate court] will generally presume that the record supports the
trial court's factual findings/7 Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Defendant includes in his brief that part of the transcript setting out the
juror's description of his contact with a witness and the court's acceptance of the
juror's apology. Aplt. Br. at 12-13. However, Defendant fails to include the
conversation that immediately followed:

the prosecutor's suggestion (while

discounting the likelihood that the juror was at all biased) that an alternate might be
substituted for the juror; Defendant's strongly expressed belief that the juror would
act conscientiously and his implicit encouragement that the juror should continue to
sit; and the court's agreement with both the prosecutor's and Defendant's
assessment of the matter. R289:4-5. The proceedings clearly show that the court's
determination that the juror would act conscientiously was substantially based on
Defendant's favorable view of the juror. Id. Therefore, because Defendant has
failed to marshal this critical evidence in support of the trial court's decision to
allow the juror to sit, the Court has still greater reason to decline to consider the
merits of Defendant's claim.
Defendant nevertheless appears to argue —even while acknowledging that
"defense counsel arguably invit[ed] error or waiv[ed] the matter by not
appropriately objecting" — that the trial court erred in not substituting an alternate
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for the juror when he suggested that the trial court do so just before the case was
given to the jury. Aplt. Br. at 17-18.
Defendant's suggestion hardly provided a basis for the trial court to
reconsider the matter. Defendant provided no new facts or argument for removing
the juror. Indeed, Defendant had foreclosed any reasonable basis for removing the
juror when he had earlier emphatically agreed that the juror should remain on the
jury, which the court relied on. The court reminded Defendant that it had
interviewed the juror and investigated the issue, and "asked everybody if they were
comfortable with the witness [sic] list" R290.55 (emphasis added). The court then
recalled that "[n]obody expressed any objection to that at that point" and further
"reasserted the court's] conclusion that [the juror] was not tainted by the process/'
Id. Thus, by not making any further record concerning the juror-witness contact or
the basis for his changed position, Defendant has failed to provide this Court with
any ground for determining error. See State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844,
(Utah 1970) (holding no ground on which error could be found in ruling that certain
hearsay testimony was inadmissible where defendant made no proffer of proof of
excluded evidence to indicate in what manner his substantial rights were affected).
Further, the trial court's denial of the motion to substitute the alternate for the
juror did not elicit a motion for a mistrial from Defendant. A motion for mistrial
would have compelled the trial court to consider any further basis for the requested
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substitution of jurors. But Defendant did not move for a mistrial or offer any
argument in support of such a motion. Thus, Defendant again substantially invited
any error in allowing the juror to deliberate. See Smith, 776 P.2d at 932 (holding
defendant invited error when, having two opportunities to move for mistrial based
on threatening calls to juror, he "deliberately and affirmatively refused on both
occasions").
In sum, because Defendant led the trial court into any error in allowing the
juror to sit and because Defendant never provided the court with a reasoned basis
for removing the juror, this Court should decline to consider the merits of
Defendant's claim. In any case, the claim is meritless because the juror was not
tainted by his brief, incidental, and insubstantial conversation with a witness.
C

The juror-witness contact was incidental, unintended, and brief,
"'[A] rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any unauthorized

contact during a trial between witnesses . . . . and jurors 'unless such contact is a
'mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact/" Day, 815 P.2d at 1350 (quoting
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224,225-26 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Pike
712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985)) (emphasis added).
Here, the rebuttable presumption does not arise because the contact was
merely incidental, unintended, and brief.
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,

The juror did not seek out a witness in order to converse with him. Rather,
seeking to rejoin his fellow jurors for the afternoon session of court, he inadvertently
turned down the wrong hallway, where, instead of jurors, witnesses were gathering.
R289:3. One of the witnesses initiated the contact by commenting that he had been
waiting since 8:00 a.m. Id. at 3. Thus, the contact was plainly incidental and
unintended by the juror, an assessment Defendant does not dispute.
The encounter was also brief. Responding to the witness's comment, the juror
said, "Well, you could be in someplace like Chicago in a [sic] airport, you know,
with a blizzard/' They then discussed airport carpeting for "maybe two minutes —
that's the entire conversation." Id. at 3-4. At that point they both realized that they
should not be talking to each other and ended the conversation. Id. at 4.
Defendant argues that the juror's estimate that the contact only lasted a
couple of minutes could not be accurate because of the multiple topics the two men
discussed: "medication, prolonged waiting due to court delays, the weather, and
airport carpeting." Aplt. Br. at 12,15-16. But Defendant merely speculates. The
juror did not discuss his medication at all with the witness, and the references to
wait time and the weather appear to have been nothing more than a brief
introduction to the discussion about carpeting. Id. at 3-4. Ajid that discussion could
easily have been limited to two minutes, before the juror and witness realized their
mistake in talking to each other and broke off their conversation. Id. at 3-4. In sum,
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the record supports that the juror-witness contact was incidental, unintended, and
brief.
In spite of the foregoing facts, Defendant nevertheless argues that a
presumption of prejudice arose from this juror-witness contact, reyling primarily on
two cases - State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415,237 P.2d 941 (1925) and Pike. Aplt. Br. at
9-12. Contrary to Defendant's argument, both cases are variously distinguishable
from this case by the substantiality, length, and intrinsic prejudice of the jurorwitness contacts in those cases.
In Anderson, the witness drove a juror to and from the courthouse daily
throughout a trial that lasted approximately three weeks, based on a mutual
arrangement between the two men. 237 P. at 942. The witness apparently did not
go out of his way to create the arrangement or receive compensation, the juror
swore that he was not influenced by the arrangement, and both men swore that they
did not discuss the case. Id. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court could not
disregard that the arrangement was a "substantial favor" to the juror over an almost
three-week period, undermining its confidence that the juror had not been
influenced. Id. at 944.
The contact in Pike was also more substantial than in this case. There, a police
officer admitted to the trial court that he had been approached by a juror who asked
him why he was limping. 712 P.2d at 279. The officer answered that he had injured
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his toe. Id. at 279. The juror asked how he did that. Id. The officer started to
explain that he slipped in his backyard, when the trial court interrupted the officer,
and reserved resolution of the matter until after the verdict was in. Id. Two other
jurors were privy to the officer's conversation with the first juror. Id. at 280. The
trial court's inquiry into the matter never disclosed the entire contents of the
conversation.

Id.

On these facts, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the

conversation amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact and no doubt had
the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors
judgment as to credibility." Id. See also State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009,1011 (Utah
App. 1992) (holding presumption of prejudice unrebutted as to conversation
between victim and juror, high school acquaintances, about upcoming reunion,
which bred sense of familiarity, in spite of juror's assertion that she would not be
impaired by discussion) (cited Aplt. Br. at 14).
The contacts in these cases were far more substantial than in this case:
Anderson — close contact involving witness providing favor to juror for roughly three
weeks; Pike — conversation of indeterminate period naturally giving rise to multiple
jurors' sympathy for witness; and Swain - conversation between high school
acquaintances about upcoming reunion. Therefore, Defendant has provided no
authority to support his claim that the contact in this case gave rise to a presumption
of prejudice. Rather, the facts of this case show nothing more than a unintended
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and incidental encounter between a witness and juror with no close bond, briefly
discussing matters totally unrelated to the trial. Nothing suggests that the juror was
prejudiced by this encounter or that any observers would have been suspicious of or
questioned the integrity of the trial. Indeed, the juror, who appears to have brought
the matter to the court on his own, apologized profusely and assured the court that
such an encounter would not happen again, which suggests that juror clearly
appreciated the import of his mistake and would scrupulously avoid bias in favor of
the witness. R289:4. Accordingly, Defendant's claim should be rejected.
But even if the contact was sufficiently long and substantial to create a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. One
major factor, critical to reversal in Defendant's cited authority, is absent from this
case: juror contact with a prominent witness. See e.g. Anderson, 237 P.2d at 943-44
(witness was victim, took an active part in prosecution, assisted district attorney by
instructing him as to certain lines of questions to be propounded to witnesses, was
present in court daily, and appeared "at least vitally concerned in the result to be
reached"); Pike, 712 P.2d at 278-80 (witness was "an important prosecution witness,
who was both the arresting officer and a witness at the scene of the altercation" that
led to aggravated assault charges); State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah App.
1992) (juror discussed personal matters for four to five minutes with "key" witness).
Compare Swain, 835 P.2d at 1010 (reversing without regard that witness was victim
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in case where juror and witness were high school acquaintances who discussed an
upcoming reunion), with State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 96 (UT App. 1987) (holding
that State rebutted presumption of prejudice where witness was "not a key witness
nor in such a respected position that he would likely be influentiar) rev'd on other
grounds, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).
Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that the juror spoke with a prominent
witness. Indeed, no single witness was crucial to the State's case because evidence
of all the elements of the aggravated robbery was supported by the testimony of
multiple witnesses. The State had to prove that Defendant, as a party to the offense,
(1) unlawfully and intentionally took personal property from another person and
did so (2) against the person's will, by force or fear using a dangerous weapon.
R211,225, 229. As to the first element, at least four witnesses testified that they saw
Defendant or his accomplice, Valdez, leave Grant's bedroom with personal property
(R293:13, 58-59; 294:12,31), and at least five other witness observed Defendant or
Valdez in possession of the property at some point as they made their escape from
the house. R294:81,145,203,248-49,256-57. At least four other witnesses provided
circumstantial evidence that Defendant and Valdez took Grant's property when that
evidence was returned after it was found in the car they had come to the party in.
R294:151-52, 237-28, 251, 292-93. As to the second element, at least ten witnesses
testified that either Defendant or Valdez or both of them brandished knives in a
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violent and threatening manner as they made their way out of the house. R293:1415,59-60; 294:67, 79,103-07,128-29,143-45,187,203,262. Three of those witnesses
testified that the knife blade wielded by either Defendant or Valdez was four inches
long. R294:66,104, 202. And the undisputed testimony of six witnesses was that
Valdez stabbed four guests with a knife as he and Defendant made their escape.
R294:37, 70,86, 93,120,129,149.
In sum, even if a presumption of prejudice arose from the juror's conversation
with some witness, the presumption was rebutted because no witness was so key to
the State's case that a juror would have voted to acquit but for a bias in favor of that
witness.2

Defendant also suggests that the trial court committed plain error in
refusing to remove the juror. Aplt. Br. at 2-3. The Court should decline to address
this claim because, apart from stating the elements of the plain error test, Defendant
provides no legal analysis for its application. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App
191, ^f 7 ("[A] claim will not be reviewed by an appellate court where the "brief
wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support... [the] argument/') (citation
omitted). Moreover, Defendant's invitation of any error precludes application of the
plain error doctrine. See Winfield, 2005 UT 4, f 14 (declining plain error review
where error has been invited) (citations omitted).
Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective "in not timely
recognizing or appropriately raising the [juror-witness contact] issue with the trial
court." Aplt. Br. at 18. The Court should also decline to address this claim because,
as discussed, Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence that he emphatically
agreed that the juror should be allowed to continue to sit and that the trial court
expressly relied on Defendant's agreement. See State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, f
35, 246 P.3d 151 (declining to consider issue because defendant failed to properly
marshal the evidence). In any case, based on the argument above, any such claim
would be futile. See State v. Clwcon, 962 P,2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) ("Neither
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT DENIED A MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER A STATE
WITNESS BRIEFLY MENTIONED PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED
INFORMATION
Defendant claims that the trial erred in denying his mistrial motion based on a
detective's reference that IDs belonging to other people were found in the pocket of
a jacket that could be identified as belonging to Defendant. Aplt. Br. at 19-23. The
claim fails because the reference was unintentionally elicited, brief, quickly passed
over by the prosecutor, and unreferenced by Defendant. Further, evidence of
Defendant's guilt was very strong.
A. The proceedings concerning the detective's reference to IDs found in
Defendant's jacket.
After arriving at the party, Defendant asked another guest to put his jacket in
the car in which he arrived at the party. R294:151, 215-16. The next day, Marty
Newbury found Defendant's jacket in the car. Id. at 151, 163. He gave the
investigating detective the jacket and a couple of Ipods and a cell phone also found
in the car in which Defendant and Valdez fled. Id. at 152-53,227-28. The parties had

speculative claims nor counsel's failure to make futile objections establishes
ineffective assistance of counsel."). Noteworthy on this point is that Defendant
filed a motion for a rule 23B remand which was unsupported by any affidavits from
the juror or witness at issue. See Utah R. App. 23B(b) (motion "shall include or be
accompanied by affidavits" alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney and prejudice
resulting therefrom). Accordingly, this Court denied the motion, observing that the
record was sufficient to make the ineffectiveness claim.
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earlier stipulated that the IDs found in the pockets of Defendant's jacket would not
be mentioned at trial. Id. at 174.
On direct examination, Sandy City Police Detective Kodie Gill confirmed that
he had received certain items in his investigation of the case: "A couple of Ipods, a
cellphone, a leather coat, a wallet inside the leather coat with several people - several people type IDs/' R294:285-86, 292. Defendant did not object to the
detective's reference to the multiple IDs, and the prosecutor immediately followed
Detective Gill's response with questions concerning the Ipods and without any
reference to the IDs. Id. at 292-93.
After his cross-examination of Detective Gill, Defendant moved for a mistrial
on the ground that mention that Defendant had IDs belonging to other people
suggested he was guilty of identity theft which prejudice at least some of the jurors.
Rl94:295-97. The prosecutor acknowledged that he had failed to tell the detective
not to mention the IDs, but that he also did not expect that information to come out.
Id. at 295-96. The trial court noted that reference to the IDs should not have been
made, but nevertheless denied the motion, explaining that the statement"went by
pretty quickly/' "[i]t was not emphasized by the prosecution/' and defense counsel
did not emphasize it either. Id. at 297. The court further noted that the error was
not deliberate and would not prejudice Defendant. Id. at 298. The court offered to
give a curative instruction, but Defendant declined the offer, fearing that it would
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"emphasize the negative/' and chose instead to "just let it pass by/' Id. at 297-98.
Nevertheless, just before Defendant testified, the court struck the evidence
concerning the jacket and instructed the jury to disregard any testimony relating to
the jacket and to anything found in the jacket. R295:14.
B. Any prejudice stemming from the unintentional reference to the IDs
was cured when parties quickly moved on without further reference,
and the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative
instruction,
"[The reviewing] court 'will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for
mistrial absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, f 57,4
P.3d 100 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,1230 (Utah 1997) overruled on oilier
grounds, State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 34,116 P.3d 305). "If the trial court determines
that the incident probably did not prejudice the jury, the court should deny the
motion." Id. (citing Robertson at 1230-31) (emphasis added). "'Unless a review of the
record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely
influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, [the
reviewing court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.'"
Id. (quoting Robertston at 1231). The reviewing court gives just deference to the trial
court's ruling "because of the advantaged position of the trial judge to determine
the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on the total proceedings." Robertson
at 1231
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"A review of [Utah] case law amply reveals that a mistrial is not required
where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is
relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony presented." State v. Allen 2005 UT
11, H 40,108 P.3d 730, cert denied, 546 U.S. 832.
In Allen, a witness impermissibly mentioned that the defendant had been
asked to take a lie detector test. Id. at H 36. Defense counsel allowed the state to
continue the direct examination and then asked for a bench conference in which
defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial court denied the motion, finding
the statement to be "simply innocuous" and not overly prejudicial. Id. at H 37.
Applying the foregoing standards, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
denial of the motion, citing as its reasons that the statement was "not intentionally
elicited or planned," "was vague and mentioned only that [the defendant] had been
asked to take a lie detector test—not that [he] had actually taken or failed to pass
such a test," "was brief," "no further attention was directed to either a lie detector
test or [the] statement," and "the district court offered to give the jury a curative
instruction." Id. at HU 39,43.
The supreme court reached the same reuslt in State v. Butterfield, where an
improper statement had been made regarding a photograph taken of a defendant at
the county jail. 2001 UT 59, H 47,27 P.3d 1133. The court ruled that the statement
was "not intentionally elicited," "vague," and "fleeting." Id. Further the defendant
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"pointed to no evidence in the record to suggest that the jury relied on [the
witness's] statement," or that the jury would not have found him guilty but for the
improper reference Id.
In State v. Wach, the supreme court upheld a lower court's decision to deny a
motion for mistrial where a witness introduced evidence of prior bad acts in
violation of a stipulation because the statement was "not elicited by the prosecutor"
and was an "isolated, off-hand remark, buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony,"
and was "not necessarily inflammatory." 2001UT 35,1146,24 P.3d 948. The supeme
court reached the same decision in State v. Decorso, affirming the trial court's denial
of a motion for mistrial where a witness made improper statements regarding other
crimes of the defendant, noting that the reference "came only after a lengthy direct
examination and lengthy cross-examination . . . moving along without undue
interruption." 1999 UT 57, H 39,993 P.2d 837. See also State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879,
881, 883 (Utah 1988) (holding district court did not commit reversible error by
allowing witness to improperly state defendant possessed an outstanding warrant
on another offense because where statement was unintentionally elicited, was "very
brief" and "only made in passing," provided no details of why warrant was issued
or to which offense it related, and district court admonished jury to disregard
statement); State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1976) (holding district court
properly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial after witness stated defendant
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had been incarcerated in prison where statement was inadvertent, not intentionally
elicited, and neither counsel nor court made further reference to it).
The facts support the same outcome in this case. The prosecutor admitted
that he had mistakenly failed to tell the detective not to mention the IDs, but the
reference was brief, and the parties moved on without further reference to the IDs.
In denying Defendant's mistrial motion, the court relied on those facts. R294:297.
The court further noted that the error was not deliberate and would not prejudice
Defendant. Id. at 298.
Also, the detective's statement was vague, a factor mentioned in the foregoing
authority. Detective Gill did not provide any detail about the IDs, the number of
IDs, their nature, to whom they belonged, or that they directly constituted evidence
of criminal wrongdoing. R294:292. In fact, Defendant was not charged with any
offense related to identity theft in connection with this incident. And even if some
jurors were able to infer from two witnesses' testimony that the jacket likely
belonged to Defendant, the reference to the IDs was no more prejudicial than
references to a defendant's jail time (Butterfield; Case), prior bad acts (Wach),
outstanding warrants (Griffiths), or prior crimes (Decorso).
Further, the trial court struck the evidence and gave a curative instruction,
directing the jury to disregard any testimony relating to the jacket and to anything
found in the jacket. R295:14. While Defendant disparages the use of curative
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instructions, see Aplt. Br. at 22-23, Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly affirmed
their utility. See e.g. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,272 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that
few trials could be successfully concluded if trial judges were prohibited from
giving "routine" curative instructions, and asserting that judicial system relies on
jurys' intergrity in following the law as instructed); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
401 (Utah 1994) (holding discovery violation sufficiently cured when impermissible
testimony was stricken and the jury was instructed to ignore it); State v. Alfred, 2002
UT App 291, Tf 20, 55 P.3d 1158 (upholding denial of mistrial motion stemming
from improper testimony of defendant's having previously received Miranda
warnings where court provided curative instruction). In sum, given the brevity,
vagueness, de-emphasis, and unitendedness of the detective's comment, the court's
curative instruction could only have assisted in diminishing any prejudice
stemming from it
Finally, evidence of guilt was very compelling. See State v. Duran, 2011 UT
App 254, Tf^f. 35-39,

P.3d

(upholding denial of mistrial motion where

testimony suggesting defendant's prior criminality was brief, unintended, and
evidence of guilt was strong). As discussed above, multiple witnesses testified to
each and every element required to prove aggravated robbery. Aple. Br. at LC
Base on all circumstances surrounding the detective's statement there is no
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reasonable basis for this Court to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying the motion for mistrial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ? day of August, 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTO

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*HChapter 6. Offenses Against Property
"•Part 3. Robbery
•*•§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1- 601:
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a
robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 1994, c.
271, 5 1: Laws 2003, c. 62, S 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
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OCTOBER 22, 2008; 2:00

p.m.

PROCEEDINGS

(After
proceedings

voir

dire

and noon recess,

in chambers were had with
one of the jury
THE COURT:

the

the Court,

following
counsel,

and

members.)

It has come to our attention you were

talking to some witnesses from the prosecution! s side there and
itf s something we iust canf t do.

So the Question I have for

you, I have to look into it —
JUROR:

Yes. Yes.

THE COURT: How did you come to talk to them?
JUROR: Well, you know.

I have got a lot of voads

with ire, obviously, we were discussing it this morning.
when I came through security, no problem.
problem.

Monday

This morning, no

This afternoon they wanted to look at everything,

which is great, it is just makes it safer for me and I don't
care. But it did make me a bit late coming upstairs.
I saw these people and I thought, well, I saw those
people this morning.
weren't.

I thought they were fellow jurors, they

I turned on the wrong hallway.

thing we discussed down there —
there and had been waiting.

I recall the only

I got this — we're waiting

One of the first guys said, "I

have been here since 8:00 this iteming." And I said, "Well,
you could be in someplace like Chicago in a airport, you know,
with the blizzard."

So i t ' s — we were discussing airport
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carpeting. We realized the mistake and that's all we
discussed.
Maybe two minutes, that's the entire conversation
that we had.
THE COURT: Anything else happen?
JUROR: No.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
JUROR: Yes. I apologize for screwing this up.
THE COURT: Your apology is accepted.
JUROR: It ain't going to happen again, I'll
guarantee you that.
THE COURT: Before you leave, anybody want to ask any
questions?
MR. JANZEN: No. No.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, [Juror].
Thank you.
(Whereupon the juror

exited

chambers.)

THE COURT: Get all the jurors in one room and
[Juror]. Where are they now?
THE BAILIFF: They are in the jury room.
THE COURT: Just put him — well, hold for a second.
Just want to close the door. Okay. It sounds like it is a
pretty innoxious encounter at that point.
MR. S3M£S: Yes.
MR. PLAYER: I agree. If you want to make him an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-1

alternate because of the encounter and put one of the others in

2

as an alternate I wouldn't think that would be inappropriate.

3

But I don't think it's a —

4

that he made a mistake.

A5

MR. SBMS:

Yeah, I think that I don't feel

6

differently.

7

feeling.

8

an honest mistake.

9

wouldn't happen again.

10
11

I think he feels bad for both sides

Well, nothing inappropriate happened, that's my

But you could tell he takes it very seriously.

It is

He feels so badly about it. He said it
I think he's going to be conscious and

a good juror.
THE COURT:

I suspect that's true.

I don't know.

My

12

inclination is not to change anything in the lineup at this

13

point but simply, you know, find it was an innoxious encounter.

14

It did seem to be of such a nature he's not likely to be

15

influenced in any way pro or con.

16

MR. JENZEN:

The only thing, Your Honor, I would

17

mention is, we should probably bring him back and have him make

18

sure he doesn't discuss this whole situation with other jurors.

19

THE COURT: Yes. That's a very good idea. Why don't

20

you ask him to come back in.

21 I

22

(TtlS

niirr^r . r e e n t e r e d chsinhSII'S. )

THE COURT: [Juror], the only thing I want to tell

23

you as you're going back to the jury, don't discuss this

24

incident with any of the jurors in any way.

25

JUROR:

No problem.
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THE COURT: And nothing else will cane of it and
thank you for your candor.
JUROR:

I apologize for that.

THE COURT:

It's accepted.

Thank you very much, okay.

(Juror

excused.)

THE COURT: Are we ready to go then?

(Whereupon the following

proceedings

in front
THE COURT:

of the

were had in the

courtrocsi

jury.)

The jury is here in the jury box and

Defendant and counsel are here. The prosecution is here
representing as well.
Jury ready to go forward? Okay.
You have been ready for a little while.

I apologize

to you for the wait. We occasionally do have delays.

I will

assure you that we are not sitting around while that's
happening, we're working.

You may have already concluded but

I'nt sure by the tiire you will, by the tiire we/re done with
this, this is not an extremely efficient process. And I try to
keep these kinds of delays to a minimum.

But I appreciate your

T3atience in the zt^antiir^.
We'll start with the jury instructions and pass out
copies of those jury instructions.

I'm starting on page Roman

Numeral one, which is about the fourth page in. All right.

(Thereupon the jury was charged with the jury
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instructions.)

1

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

STATE OF UTAH,

)
PLAINTIFF,

5

j

6

VS.

)

7

TEVIEA F. TAFUNA

)

DEFENDANT.

8

Case No. 071402390

)

9
10
BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. ROTH

11
12
13
14

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - WEST JORDAN
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088

15
16
17

FILES) SISTiiOT COURT

18

Third Judicial District

19

APR 87 2 0 ^
JURY TRIAL,
OCTOBER 2 4 , 2008 Br.

20

SALT Uj/K* COUNTY

ifri
UkAHAPPELLAiE COURTS fj[_g.

21

FILED

Deputy CMflC

*""

y

22

,,„

23

04 2 0 i p H

A P P E I K * COURTS
AU(j 0 1^2003

24
REPORTED BY:
25

KATIE HARMON
(801) 238-7105
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1

giving us the time. I hope that it was an experience that you

2

feel was in same way at least worthwhile. There was some

a3

compensation for you being here.

4

And I hope things go well with you. I won't see you

5

again I hope. I hope we won't need to call you.

6

Have any questions at this point?

J

Make sure the clerk does have your phone numbers and

8 I contact information. And renumber, it's "^ust as if Trou were
9

going home last night. You are under the sane restraints as

10
11
^

previously, okay.
We did order you lunch. Kept you past the noon hour

j

12

and lunch is being ordered. So talk to the clerk about getting

13

that. If you want to wait just a few minutes we'll pick it up

14

and bring it to you. You don't have to stay for lunch if you

15
•2*

don't want.
I

16

You are excused at this point. And let's have you

17

come over and give your contact information. Let's get out of

IS

the room before we go ahead and release everybody else.

19

Maybe the bailiff can get the contact information out

20

back. Why don't you go out back with the bailiff and we'll do

21

that.

22

(vihareupazi the alternate

jurors

were

excused.)

23

THE COURT

Counsel r is there anything else?

24

MR. SB£4S

Yes.

25

THE COURT

Have a seat.
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1

MR. SIMMS: I think the Court indicated, thought

2

that —

3

THE COURT: Let's put that on the record.

4

MR. SIMMS: The one juror who had a conversation with

5
3

witnesses, I think the Court felt the issue was resolved. And
1

6

we'd noved at the end, just in abundance of caution, say let's,

7

you know, let's — that person nay be tainted, could be

S ! tainted, whv don't we, because we have an untainted alternate
9

move to that alternate? And I think the Court said, no, that

10

issue has been decided. We're going to have him remain on the

11

jury.

12

THE COURT: I did. And there was a request made to

13

remove [Juror] and substitute with an alternate based on issues

lA

we've discussed before with him and separately that he had been

15

seen in conversation with witnesses for the prosecution early

16

in the process. We get a lot that on — we did interview him

17

and before we cane in here we had a bench conference — or a

18

conference in chambers that was recorded, it may have been, in

19

which I asked everybody if they were comfortable with the

20

witness list, which excluded [Juror] and [Juror] .

21

[Juror] for cause that we had already talked.

22

[Juror] is the final remaining alternate. Nobody expressed any

23

objection to that at that point. And I reassert my conclusion

24

that he was not tainted by the process. That I believe that

25

there was an inadvertent and fleeting discussion with those
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1

witnesses. Again, they didn't know who they were. And there

2

was no taint to it. And that the issue had been resolved

3

before this had been requested. You are entitled to make your

4

request and we' re sinply making the record as you have very

5
A

professionally done.
I

6

Before we get a verdict back I want to tell you how

7

much I've appreciated professionalism shown here and

8

everybody's conduct in this. It's been a very well done trial,

9

Mr. Tafuna, you've reported yourself well in this

10

process. And also I know that you've had family and friends

11

here in support. You know, when we get a verdict out, assuming

12

we get a verdict in this, and I think we probably will of one

13

sort or another. I don't know what it's going to be. You have

14

been very good through this process. I appreciate the dignity

15

that you brought to these proceedings.

16

No matter what the verdict is please don't make any

17

demonstration or any noise about it while the jury is still in

18

here. You have been -- you've had great respect for these

19

proceedings and I appreciate that.

20

Counsel, you know the drill here. We need cellphone

21 | or contact information.
22

And anything else that we need to address?

23

MR. PLAYER: No, not from the State.

24

MR. SIMMS: No.

25

THE COURT: Thank you. The Court is in recess
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